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FOREWORD John Paul Stevens 907
INTRODUCTION TO THE JURY
AT A CROSSROAD: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE Nancy S. Marder 909
The jury is integral to the American experience of democracy and yet it appears
to be under attack. With negative press attention focused on the jury in recent years
and calls for imposing limits on the jury gaining support in state and national legisla-
tures, the jury is at a crossroad. Will reforms be made that weaken the jury's roles and
power simply to provide a quick fix for an institution that is mischaracterized as bro-
ken? This symposium provides a mult.faceted and sustained examination of the roles
of the jury past, present, and future. It explores not only the broad roles that the jury
does and should play in the American judicial system, but also offers reforms that take
as their starting-point a "jury-centric" perspective to enable the jury to function effec-
tively in the future.
I. LESSONS FROM THE PAST
THE ORIGINS OF FELONY JURY SENTENCING
IN THE UNITED STATES Nancy J. King 937
This Article traces the development of jury sentencing in non-capital felony cases
in Virginia and Kentucky, as well as the rejection of jury sentencing in Pennsylvania,
in the late eighteenth century. Several of the explanations that modern commentators
on jury sentencing have offered for the adoption of jury sentencing are questioned. In
Virginia, where party politics may have affected the choice of jury over judge, pockets
of judicial sentencing power remained, inconsistent with a strong preference for the
democratic judgment of a jury in punishment over the professional decisions of the
judiciary. Kentucky's experience suggests that settlement patterns and legal heritage,
as well as distrust of judges, were prime determinants of that state's sentencing policy.
An appendix listing early sentencing law for several states is included.
II. THE JURY AND RACE
How MUCH Do WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT RACE AND
JURIES? A REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
THEORY AND RESEARCH Samuel R. Sommers and
Phoebe C. Ellsworth 997
Social science findings are often overlooked or oversimplified by legal scholars
who write about race and juries. This body of empirical research offers important
theoretical and methodological contributions to the study of race and jury decision
making, yet it is also marked by inconsistencies and common design limitations. In
the present Article, we evaluate the state of this literature more critically and attempt
to integrate its often disparate findings using psychological theories of racial bias and
social judgment. Our review includes studies that measure the influence of a defen-
dant's race on the judgments of individual jurors; studies comparing the decision mak-
ing of White and Black mock jurors; and a handful of studies that examine the impact
of race at the group, or jury level. This analysis is followed by an exploration of a
recent mock jury experiment that demonstrates the capabilities of social science re-
search for investigating jury decision making in a controlled, yet highly realistic set-
ting. Conclusions focus on future directions for the study of race and juries, and
emphasize the general importance of utilizing multiple methodologies in any empirical
investigation of the legal system.
RACE, DIVERSITY, AND JURY COMPOSITION:
BATTERING AND BOLSTERING LEGITIMACY Leslie Ellis and
Shari Seidman Diamond 1033
Impartiality is both elusive and important for the legitimacy of the jury and its
decisions. After presenting a realistic version of impartiality that recognizes how ju-
rors reach judgments, we present empirical evidence demonstrating the costs incurred
when the promise of impartiality appears to be violated. We then evaluate various
approaches aimed primarily at increasing the racial heterogeneity of juries. Finally,
we describe a simplified, multimethod approach that combines improvements in
source lists and a simple non-race-based geographic adjustment to improve the ap-
pearance and reality of jury impartiality by increasing jury heterogeneity.
III. THE JURY IN PRACTICE
A VOIR DIRE OF VOIR DIRE: LISTENING TO
JURORS' VIEWS REGARDING THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE Mary R. Rose 1061
The use of the peremptory challenge during jury selection continues to be a
source of controversy, in part because critics are concerned about the attitudes and
reactions of those allegedly excused on the basis of stereotypes, i.e., "for no reason."
In the present research, a sample of people excused from criminal juries via the per-
emptory were followed-up and asked to speculate on why they were excused, as well
as to rate their experience with jury selection on a number of dimensions. I hypothe-
sized that even if all rationales involved some amount of "stereotyping," people's
views about being excused should vary in terms of acceptability. Specifically, those
excused on the basis of how they acted during jury selection, or because of prior ex-
periences with the legal system, were both expected and found to be more accepting
of the decision to excuse them compared to people excused on the basis of other
personal characteristics. Despite differences in support for decisions, perceived rea-
sons for being excused were not associated with other ratings of jury selection, includ-
ing a sense of having been treated fairly, people's overall satisfaction with the jury
experience, or stated willingness to serve on a jury in the future. Further, when asked
to provide examples of unfair treatment, the peremptory challenge was rarely men-
tioned. This research suggests that prospective jurors are aware of and rather ac-
cepting of the role of adversarial interests in jury selection.
THE CURRENT DEBATE ON JUROR QUESTIONS:
"To ASK OR NOT To ASK, THAT IS
THE QUESTION" Nicole L. Mott 1099
This Article addresses the concerns as well as the advantages when courts allow
jurors to submit questions to the court and/or witnesses. Based on reviewing the con-
tent of 2,271 juror questions submitted in 164 cases, the author categorizes what jurors
typically ask and to whom jurors direct their questions. Most juror questions were
directed to witnesses and experts. In both criminal and civil cases, jurors typically
asked facts about the case, motives of both the witness and the defendant/party, and
common practices of professions often unfamiliar to laypersons. In criminal cases,
jurors were more likely to question specific eyewitness evidence or facts. More fitting
to civil cases, jurors frequently asked financial questions.
Most juror questions aimed to clarify testimony, not to introduce new evidence or
interrogate witnesses. Jurors utilize the question-asking procedure to enhance their
role as a neutral fact finder, not to the detriment of the adversary system. Based on
empirical evaluations, and with appropriate judicial discretion and court management
of questioning, the concerns of critics appear unfounded.
JURORS AND THE FUTURE OF
"TORT REFORM" Judge B. Michael Dann (ret.) 1127
Jurors are not supposed to allow their personal attitudes about the law, including
tort law, affect their decision. This Essay asserts, however, that jurors, acting as con-
scientious and impartial decision makers, in fact do have cognitive and emotional
"stakes" in tort litigation, namely the trial process that they are subjected to, and in
making fair and equitable decisions. Various "tort reform" proposals affect, for better
or worse, jurors' abilities to understand the evidence and the law, apply the law to the
facts, and do justice. The author, a former trial judge, and a self-confessed "juror-
centric" supporter of jury trial reforms, "rates" scores of current reform proposals
according to their potential to improve or detract from the jurors' abilities to do their
jobs. Special attention is paid to two specific proposals of "high salience" for juries.
Policymakers are urged to take jurors' needs into account when considering changes in
tort law and trial practice.
WHEN ALL OF Us ARE VICTIMS: JUROR PREJUDICE
AND "TERRORIST" TRIALS Neil Vidmar 1143
On September 11, 2001 all Americans became victims. The threat of terrorism at
home and abroad, now and for the indefinite future, is not only to their physical safety
and economic well-being, but also to their deeply held social and political values. The
terrorists have been identified as members of the Muslim faith and most are of Middle
Eastern ethnic descent. This Article discusses the problem of persons accused of be-
ing terrorists, or aiding terrorists, obtaining a fair trial in the light of this national
victimization. Research conducted for the "American Taliban" case of John Walker
Lindh, reported in the Article, illustrates Americans' emotional and cognitive re-
sponses to accused terrorists and raises serious questions about the effectiveness of
routine procedural remedies for juror prejudice.
AVOID BALD MEN AND PEOPLE WITH GREEN SOCKS?
OTHER WAYS To IMPROVE THE VOIR DIRE PROCESS
IN JURY SELECTION Valerie P. Hans and Alayna Jehle 1179
During jury selection, many courts adopt a minimal approach to voir dire ques-
tioning, asking a small number of close-ended questions to groups of prospective ju-
rors and requiring prospective jurors to volunteer their biases. The Article describes
research evidence showing that limited voir dire questioning is often ineffective in
detecting juror bias. To improve the effectiveness of voir dire, the authors make four
recommendations: (1) increase the use of juror questionnaires; (2) incorporate some
open-ended questions; (3) expand the types of questions that are asked; and (4) allow
attorneys to participate in voir dire.
DEATH OF AN ACCOUNTANT: THE JURY CONVICTS
ARTHUR ANDERSEN OF OBSTRUCTION
OF JUSTICE Stephan Landsman 1203
Since at least the time of Peter Zenger, American juries have served as agents of
legal and social change. When and how juries become involved in transformative de-
cision making has only occasionally been examined. This Article seeks to explore the
jury as change agent in the context of the recent conviction of the Arthur Andersen
accounting firm on a charge of obstruction of justice. It analyzes the erroneous belief
that the case would be a "slam-dunk" for the government, detailing why the jury
found the matter so difficult to decide. It then considers the reasons for the govern-
ment's hard-won victory as well as the legal and social implications of the jury's
verdict.
NULLIFICATION AT WORK? A GLIMPSE FROM THE
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS STUDY
OF HUNG JURIES Paula L. Hannaford-Agor
and Valerie P. Hans 1249
In recent years, the criminal justice community has become increasingly con-
cerned about the possibility that jury nullification is the underlying motivation for
increasing numbers of acquittals and mistrials due to jury deadlock in felony jury tri-
als. In this Article, the authors discuss the inherent difficulty in defining jury nullifica-
tion and identifying its occurrence in actual trials. They review the evolution in public
and legal opinion about the legitimacy of jury nullification and contemporary judicial
responses to perceived instances of jury nullification. Finally, the authors examine the
possible presence of jury nullification through empirical analysis of data collected
from 372 felony jury trials in four state courts. Jurors' opinions about the fairness of
the law proved to be related to trial outcomes. However, case characteristics, particu-
larly the strength and credibility of trial evidence, were the strongest predictors of
verdicts. The authors conclude that jury nullification is an unlikely factor in the vast
majority of felony trials. When juror attitudes about legal fairness do play a role, they
most likely do so by affecting how jurors perceive and interpret trial evidence, rather
than by leading jurors to intentionally disregard the governing law.
IV. REINVIGORATING THE JURY
JURORS AS STATUTORY INTERPRETERS Lawrence M. Solan 1281
The standard division of labor at trial is that jurors find facts and judges interpret
statutes. But this was not always the standard, and it is still not always so. Until the
end of the nineteenth century, it was up to jurors not only to find the facts, but also to
determine the law, at least in criminal cases. This task was considered an important
part of democratic government in that it created a buffer of twelve citizens who could
refuse to convict if a law was considered unduly oppressive. This history is sometimes
discussed as relevant to the practice of some juries to engage in nullification. The
practice, however, is far more widespread. Juries are routinely called upon to deter-
mine whether a defendant's conduct fits within the fair and ordinary meaning of a
statute, which is exactly what appellate judges must determine when deciding cases
that involve statutory interpretation. More than two hundred years into the nation's
history, the legal system remains ambivalent about just how broad the jury's role
should range.
A CONSERVATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE
OF THE AMERICAN JURY TRIAL Robert P. Burns 1319
The American jury trial has evolved in a way that is deeply respectful of the dense
complexity of competing values that pervade our common life. The consciously struc-
tured hybrid of languages and practices of which the trial is composed reflects those
values fairly. The trial is thus the crucible of democracy. Simplistic understandings of
the trial rooted in a form of legal positivism and an affection for bureaucracy threaten
it. We must be very careful of distorting the architecture of what we have achieved in
one of greatest achievements of our public culture. This is not to say that reform is
impossible, but reform must be approached carefully and with an adequate under-
standing of what the trial means for us.
PROOF BEYOND ALL POSSIBLE DOUBT: Is THERE A
NEED FOR A HIGHER BURDEN OF PROOF WHEN
THE SENTENCE MAY BE DEATH? Judge Leonard B. Sand
and Danielle L. Rose 1359
Recent studies conclude that errors occur in the American capital punishment
system with such frequency that it is entirely foreseeable that, if continued unaltered,
numerous innocent persons will be executed. Assuming that this is unacceptable but
that America will wish to continue to utilize the death penalty in its justice system, the
authors believe that society has a duty to try to reduce the frequency of such errors.
The authors propose that the requisite burden of proof in the penalty phase of a capi-
tal trial should be raised from beyond a reasonable doubt to beyond all possible doubt.
The authors discuss the meaning of the beyond all possible doubt standard, explain
how it may be included in a jury's capital deliberation, and explore the possible effects
of its integration. The authors conclude that increasing the standard of proof is a
valuable measure to reduce error in the American capital punishment system.
STUDENT NOTES
TECHNOLOGY SERVICE SOLUTIONS: NEW WINE
IN OLD WINESKINS? Elizabeth A. Pawlicki, O.P. 1379
This Comment examines the National Labor Relations Board's decision in Tech-
nology Services Solutions, which held-via application of the Supreme Court's "rea-
sonable alternative means" test-that an employer did not commit an unfair labor
practice when it refused to provide the union attempting to organize the employer's
teleworking customer service representatives with employees' names and addresses.
After reviewing the evolution of union access rules, Pawlicki argues that by endorsing
the application of traditional union access rules to the nontraditional telework envi-
ronment, the National Labor Relations Board effectively denied an emerging segment
of U.S. workers a right that has long been a cornerstone of national labor policy-the
right to organize and join a union. Finally, the author suggests a scheme for determin-
ing when employers should be required to provide the names and home addresses of
workers to employees or nonemployee union organizers seeking to organize the
teleworkplace.
THIS LAND Is MY LAND: THE NEED FOR A
FEASIBILITY TEST IN EVALUATION OF
TAKINGS FOR PUBLIC NECESSITY Thomas J. Posey 1403
Federal and state governments, through the use of eminent domain, may con-
demn the property of a private landowner and use that property to meet a public
necessity. If the landowner challenges the condemnation, the courts generally per-
form an extremely narrow review of the government's decision to take the land. In
order to prevail, the landowner must show either that the taking was in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions, or that some gross impropriety such as fraud or
abuse of discretion occurred. However, landowners generally may not base their chal-
lenges on the grounds that the proposed project is unfeasible or unlikely to be com-
pleted. This notion that the feasibility of public necessity projects should never be
judicially examined is clearly evidenced in two recent state cases: Itasca v. Carpenter
and Comes v. City of Atlantic. In both of these cases, the government was allowed to
condemn private lands for a public necessity, despite evidence that the land might
never be used to alleviate that necessity. The practical effect of these holdings was to
weaken the security of private land rights by making it easier for the government to
exercise eminent domain powers. Although there will always be some possibility that
a project designed to meet a public necessity will not be completed, this Note argues
that landowners should be allowed to raise feasibility challenges in certain limited
circumstances. Specifically, it proposes judicial means to limit the use of eminent do-
main in cases where the government is unlikely to use the condemned land to com-
plete the necessity project, and suggests that judicial review of the feasibility of
proposed necessity projects should be performed, in limited circumstances, through
the application of a burden-shifting test. The Note concludes by addressing common
arguments against judicial inquiry into the feasibility of necessity projects and by
pointing out flaws in the economic reasoning of those arguments.
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